We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus e¤ect disappears when representative information is readily available. But the e¤ect reappears if a small cognitive e¤ort is required to retrieve the information. Most subjects apparently ignore valuable information if it is not handed on a silver platter. We conclude that the relevance of the false consensus e¤ect depends on the di¢culty of the information retrieval and that the underlying mechanism is an information processing de…ciency rather than egocentricity.
Introduction
Violations of the rationality postulates of economics, so-called choice anomalies, have received substantial attention by economists (see Camerer, 1995) , because they question the fundamental tools of economic analysis. The relevance of anomalies for economic modeling, however, crucially depends on how well they translate into economically relevant situations, hence how robust they are to learning and to changes in institutions. Friedman (1998) demonstrates that the so-called three-door anomaly can be constructed and deconstructed by the use of di¤erent experimental conditions. He argues that alleged anomalies "can be greatly diminished in appropriately structured learning environments" (p. 941) and that economists should hence focus on "which learning environments encourage or discourage speci…c kinds of anomalies . . . [and] . . . which institutions are sensitive to anomalous choice behavior" (p.942). 1 In the present paper we address this issue by way of an important example, the false consensus e¤ect. We have demonstrated in Engelmann and Strobel (2000) that this e¤ect can be made disappear by a prominent presentation of representative information. In this study, we con…rm that this deconstruction works even in a one-shot setting. We also demonstrate how the e¤ect can be reconstructed. It shows up distinctively if the retrieval of this information requires some e¤ort.
Considering social psychology literature, the 'false consensus e¤ect', going back to Ross et al. (1977) , appears to be a well-established phenomenon. Indeed, already Mullen et al. (1985) report 115 studies which show a false consensus e¤ect. Most of the studies employed a de…nition similar to that used by Mullen et al. (1985) :
False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus for their own behaviors. Speci…cally, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people 1 A discussion of the systematic construction and deconstruction of various choice anomalies is presented in Ortmann and Hertwig (2001) and Gigerenzer (1991) . who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than it is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors. 2 In short, those people who chose A expect a higher frequency of A choices than those who chose B. According to Dawes (1989 Dawes ( & 1990 , however, this type of de…nition does not justify the label 'false'. He argues that it is perfectly rational to use the information about one's own decision in the same way as the information about any other randomly selected sample of size one. The e¤ect is only false if too much weight is assigned to one's own decision. We will therefore refer to the e¤ect as de…ned above as a consensus e¤ect and use the following de…nition of a false consensus e¤ect which is both stricter and more appropriate:
A (truly) false consensus e¤ect is considered to be present if people, when forming expectations concerning other people's decisions, weight their own decision more heavily than that of a randomly selected person from the same population.
Put di¤erently, people exhibit a false consensus e¤ect, if among those with the same total information (i.e. that includes their own decision) the estimates are biased in the direction of their own decision, i.e. those who chose behavior A expect a higher frequency of A choices than those who chose B. In contrast to the traditional one, this de…nition implies that a false consensus e¤ect can be considered as a bias in a Bayesian framework. A consistent bias of expectations in the direction of a decision maker's own decision or preferences would have an impact on economic interaction whenever decisions are in ‡uenced by these expectations, most notably perhaps in …nancial markets (note the relation to overcon…dence, a similarly debated e¤ect, that has received much more attention). 3 Detecting conditions under which such a bias occurs as well as quantifying it, would improve our ability to predict human behavior greatly.
When the strict de…nition of the false consensus e¤ect is applied, results from social psychology experiments are rather ambiguous. They usually do not allow for a straightforward test and some aspects of the design appear problematic (see Dawes, 1990 , and Engelmann and Strobel, 2000 for a more detailed discussion). Studies by economists that were not designed for explicitly testing for a false consensus e¤ect, appear to provide evidence in its favor, but usually based on the traditional, inappropriate de…nition (e.g. Selten and Ockenfels, 1998, Jacobsen and Sadrieh, 1996, Charness and Grosskopf, 2001). Heijden et al. (2003) test for a consensus e¤ect in a survey experiment.
They …nd a clear consensus e¤ect, which, however, decreases signi…cantly if arguments concerning the issue at hand and …nancial incentives are provided. Their design does not allow them to conclude whether the consensus e¤ect is indeed a false consensus e¤ect.
Explicit tests for a false consensus e¤ect run in accordance with sacred principles of experimental economics (i.e. no deception and clear …nancial incentives) are provided by O¤erman et al. (1996) and by Engelmann and Strobel (2000) . O¤erman et al. examine the presence of a false consensus e¤ect in a public good experiment by comparing estimates given by participants and by observers and …nd no indication of a false consensus e¤ect. In Engelmann and Strobel (2000) subjects make 16 simple binary choices (e.g. they decide whether they want to receive their payment right after the experiment or one month later with a 10% interest). In half of the cases, they are then informed about the choices of four randomly selected subjects from the group of 16 taking part in each session, before they are asked to estimate the choice of the remaining eleven subjects.
We …nd that subjects attach a lower weight to their own choice than to the information they are presented in all …ve sessions, providing signi…cant evidence just contrary to a false consensus e¤ect. On the other hand, we …nd signi…cant evidence for a consensus e¤ect, i.e. subjects indeed 3 Forsythe et al. (1992) …nd evidence for a (false) consensus e¤ect in a political stock market. 4 consider their own choice as informative about others' choices, but as less, not more informative than the choices of randomly selected other subjects.
A common feature of O¤erman et al. (1996) and Engelmann and Strobel (2000) is that the available information is in a way handed on a silver platter. It is highly prominent and requires absolutely no e¤ort on part of the subjects to retrieve. This is even more the case in Engelmann and Strobel (2000) where we explicitly provide subjects with a list of others' choices than in O¤erman et al. (1996) where subjects observed the behavior in repeated games and hence had to keep track of the aggregated data themselves. 4 Hence the false consensus e¤ect can easily be deconstructed by the provision of highly prominent representative information. This, however, does not necessarily re ‡ect the most realistic or relevant scenarios. In contrast, outside the laboratory, one might often have to make a small cognitive e¤ort to …nd out about others' choices. And in these cases people might rely more on their own choice as a guideline than on available information because they either do not want to exert the e¤ort of retrieving the information or such information is perceived as less prominent. The deconstruction might hence work under extreme conditions, but the e¤ect might still be relevant in other cases. The question is how easily it can be reconstructed in the same framework where it has been deconstructed.
To investigate whether a false consensus e¤ect depends on the cognitive e¤ort needed to retrieve information, we compare two treatments in a simple one-shot experiment. Subjects …rst choose whether all four subjects in their group will play a lottery and then estimate how many of the twelve subjects in the three other groups of the session have chosen the lottery. The treatments di¤er in the form how information about the choice of the three other members of their own group is provided before subjects state their estimate. In one treatment the information is provided explicitly. In the second treatment, information is only implicitly provided in the form of the payo¤ of the lottery stage. This stage was designed, however, in a way that made the decisions of the other three subjects easily retrievable from the payo¤.
In a third treatment subjects estimate the choice of the three other members of their group before results from the lottery stage are provided, and then after having received detailed results of the lottery stage they again estimate the choice of the remaining twelve subjects. The …rst estimate replicates classical consensus experiments without provision of information, testing whether subjects' beliefs are biased towards their own choice in the absence of information. Comparing the second stage estimates in this treatment with those in the explicit information treatment allows us to test whether beliefs are sticky, i.e. whether subjects' beliefs are biased towards their own choice even after they received con ‡icting information, if they expressed their beliefs before.
For all estimates substantial monetary incentives were provided. To the best of our knowledge the present experiment is the …rst to systematically study the false consensus e¤ect under varying information conditions. Our main hypothesis is that subjects make less use of implicit information than of explicit information. Hence the estimates in the implicit information treatment should be more in line with a false consensus e¤ect than in the explicit information treatment because subjects should rely more on their own choice as benchmark in the former than in the latter. More speci…c hypotheses are that estimates in the explicit information treatment run counter to a false consensus e¤ect, whereas they are in line with a false consensus e¤ect in the implicit information treatment.
Put di¤erently, providing explicit information is su¢cient to deconstruct the e¤ect, making the information implicit su¢ces to reconstruct it.
Our result provide quite dramatic support for our hypotheses. In all but one of the groups in the explicit information treatment results are in opposite direction to a false consensus e¤ect, in all groups in the implicit information treatment results are in line with a false consensus e¤ect. This shows that subjects are surprisingly unwilling (or unable) to use information that is not handed to them on a silver platter. It appears to us, that in the implicit information treatment it does 6 not occur to many subjects, that the other three subjects' choices are valuable information and that this information is rather easily available, while the prominent information in the explicit information treatments is recognized as valuable information by virtually all subjects (or leads them to unconsciously update their beliefs). In the third treatment, all subjects update their beliefs as expected and beliefs are not sticky, because although …rst stage estimates are clearly biased towards the subjects' own choices, second stage estimates are not more biased towards their own choices than in the explicit information treatment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the experimental design. Section 3 contains the experimental results, followed by the conclusion.
Experimental Design
The computerized experiments were run in the laboratory of experimental economics at the University of Bonn in November and December 2002. We used the tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999) for creating the experimental software and running the experiments. The subject pool comprised 90 economics students, 14 law students, and 24 students of 20 other disciplines.
We conducted three treatments: IM with implicit information provided, EX with explicit information and BA with estimates given both before and after the provision of explicit information.
In each of eight sessions (three in EX, three in IM, and two in BA), 16 subjects participated.
Subjects gathered in a separate room next to the laboratory. After a short welcome they were randomly placed at isolated computer terminals in the laboratory where they received written instructions for the …rst stage of the experiment (for translated instructions see the Appendix).
The crucial issues were then summarized by the experimenter. Instructions for the second stage of the experiment were provided on the computer screen after the …rst stage was completed.
The experiment consisted of only one period, divided into two stages. The 16 participants were split into four groups of four, but the subjects did not know who of the other 15 subjects 7 were in their group. Each subject started the experiment with an endowment of 10 Euro. In the …rst stage of the experiment, subjects decided whether to conduct the following lottery. If they chose yes, 2 Euro were taken from each of the subjects in their group including themselves and then a prize of 10 Euro was randomly allocated to one of them. For each subject who chose yes, a separate, independent lottery was conducted. Hence if all four subjects chose a lottery the payo¤ of a subject could range from 2 to 42 Euro, if none chose a lottery they all received 10 Euro for sure, if two chose a lottery, payo¤s could be 6, 16, or 26 Euro (to be precise, they were either 6 for two subjects and 16 for the other two, or 26 for one and 6 for the other three subjects), and so on. Note that each choice of a lottery increases the total payo¤ by 2 Euro to encourage subjects to choose the lottery (as will become clear in a second, we wanted to maximize the probability of having both yes and no choices in each group of four subjects). We chose this game because it is relatively easy but not absolutely trivial to infer the other subjects' choices from one's own payo¤ after the …rst stage. For example, assume that a subject has chosen the lottery and obtains a payo¤ of 16 Euro. Then this subject knows that she has won a lottery and that two lotteries have been played. Since she has chosen the lottery, exactly one other subject has chosen the lottery as well. If a subject has not chosen the lottery and obtains a payo¤ of 24 he knows that he has won two lotteries, that three lotteries have been conducted and that hence all other subjects have chosen the lottery. Furthermore, it appears to us that there is no obvious fair or unfair choice in this game so that we can preclude that social norms bias the results towards conformity (i.e. that a subject would choose the lottery when she expects other subjects to do so because she considers it fair, as it would be the case in, e.g., public good games).
In treatments IM and EX subjects then received feedback about the results of the …rst stage.
In IM they only learned their payo¤ from the …rst period. In EX they were given detailed feedback about the number of lottery choices in the …rst stage and how many of these lotteries they had won. Treatment BA di¤ered from EX by …rst asking subjects about their estimate for the 8 number of lotteries chosen by the other three subjects in their group. For an exactly correct guess they received 5 Euro.
In the second stage of the experiment, the task was to estimate how many lotteries the twelve subjects in the other three groups of the present session had chosen. For an exactly correct guess a subject received 15 Euro, certainly enough to encourage a subject to think hard and not to ignore potentially relevant information. This stage was identical in all treatments.
After having received feedback about the correct guess and their payo¤, subjects were asked to …ll in a short questionnaire. Eventually they were called upon one by one to receive their payment in a separate room. The sessions took between 40 and 50 minutes altogether. Average earnings were 13.88 Euro.
Experimental Results
In any of the groups all four subjects have the same information when they receive the feedback from the …rst stage. If each subject considers his or her own choice to be equally informative as the choices of the other three subjects (which appears to be rational) then there should be no systematic di¤erence between the estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and by those who did not. In contrast, the false consensus hypothesis states that subjects will consider their own choice to be more informative than the information about the other subjects in their group which implies that the subjects who chose the lottery will estimate a higher number of lottery choices among the twelve remaining subjects than the subjects who did not choose the lottery.
Hence we can say that estimates in a group of four subjects correspond to a false consensus e¤ect if the di¤erence between the average estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery and the average estimate given by the subjects who did not choose the lottery is positive. 5 This measure is not de…ned for homogeneous groups where all subjects make the same choice. This is why we tried to choose experimental parameters that would provide roughly equal probabilities of choices for and against the lottery in order to maximize the number of heterogeneous groups. (We actually came relatively close to achieving this goal, the overall rate of choices in favor of the lottery is 61%).
Result 1:
In treatment EX, when forming beliefs, subjects weight their own choice signi…cantly less than the information about other subjects' choices, opposite to the false consensus hypothesis.
Hence prominent information is su¢cient to deconstruct the false consensus e¤ect. Table 1 shows the number of lotteries chosen in each of the twelve groups in treatment EX, the average estimate given by subjects who chose and who did not choose the lottery as well as the di¤erence between these estimates. Unfortunately, in both groups 10 and 12 there was one subject that had participated in a previous session. There appear to be two ways to handle this problem.
The …rst is to exclude these groups completely from the analysis, the second is to exclude the repeat subjects in the computation of average estimates in the respective groups (since the only thing a subject learns about another subject is his or her choice in the …rst stage, there is not really a danger of a repeat subject spoiling the group, so this procedure appears to be su¢cient).
The …rst approach appears to be the more careful one. It does, however, only make our results stronger, in a way rewarding us for a mistake in the procedures. Hence we follow both approaches.
As table 1 shows, there are nine heterogeneous groups and in only one of them (12) the result is in line with a false consensus e¤ect, i.e. the average estimate of lottery choices given by the subjects who chose the lottery is larger than the average estimate given by the subjects who did not. In seven of them the e¤ect is in the opposite direction, and in the last (10) there is a tie (if we include the repeat subject, the di¤erence is negative as well). 6 Since di¤erent groups in one session do not interact, we can treat each group of four as a statistically independent observation. A Wilcoxon signed rank test (for the H 0 hypothesis that 6 None of the results we report changes if we replace average estimates with median estimates. given by subjects who did not and the di¤erence between these two estimates. If this di¤erence is positive it corresponds to a false consensus e¤ect. Group numbers with an asterisk indicate groups with repeat subjects. The second number in the third and fourth columns for these groups indicates the estimate and di¤erences if these subjects are excluded.
the estimates are equal) reveals that the tendency against a false consensus e¤ect is signi…cant at a 10% level (p = 0:074; two-sided, hence for a one-sided test, that can be argued to be appropriate for our directed hypothesis, the di¤erence is signi…cant at the 5% level). Since the groups with the repeat subjects are those with a positive di¤erence and a tie, the results are more dramatic if we exclude these groups altogether (p = 0:017). 7 Hence our treatment EX replicates, as expected, our results from Engelmann and Strobel (2000): subjects, when making estimates, give signi…cantly more weight to information provided about other subjects' choices than to their own choice, if that information is prominent and available without any e¤ort. In other words we have successfully deconstructed a belief anomaly.
The natural question is whether the anomaly can be reconstructed by making the information retrieval more di¢cult. This question is answered by our implicit information treatment.
Result 2:
In treatment IM, when forming beliefs, subjects weight their own choice signi…cantly more than the information about other subjects' choices, in line with the false consensus hypothesis.
Hence making information less prominent is su¢cient to reconstruct the false consensus e¤ect. Table 2 shows the results for the twelve groups in treatment IM, with a structure identical to Table 1 . The results are even more striking than in treatment EX. There are ten heterogeneous groups and in each of them the average estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery is higher than the other subjects' average estimate, in line with a false consensus e¤ect. Furthermore, in six of the ten groups the di¤erence is substantial (> 3; corresponding to more than 25% of the target group of twelve subjects).
A Wilcoxon signed rank test reveals that this tendency in line with a false consensus e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level (p = 0:005; two-sided). Hence this treatment con…rms our hypothesis that subjects exhibit a false consensus e¤ect if representative information is only implicitly provided. This might not be considered too striking given that a subject's own choice is highly Table 2 : Results for treatment IM. The columns show from left to right the number of lotteries chosen in that group, the average estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery, that given by subjects who did not and the di¤erence between these two estimates. If this di¤erence is positive it corresponds to a false consensus e¤ect.
prominent. Note, however, that it is quite easy for subjects to retrieve the other three subjects'
choices from their payo¤ if they realize that this information might be useful. The extent of the e¤ect that we …nd suggests that most subjects simply do not come up with the idea of using the easily available information. The lower prominence of the available information in treatment IM is su¢cient to reconstruct the false consensus e¤ect.
Since we …nd a signi…cant false consensus e¤ect in treatment IM and a signi…cant e¤ect opposite to a false consensus in treatment EX, this already provides very strong support for our more modest main hypothesis that results in treatment IM are closer to a false consensus e¤ect than results in treatment EX. For the sake of completeness, we provide the result of a Mann-Whitney test of the H 0 hypothesis that the di¤erences between estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and those who did not are not di¤erent in the two treatments. We can reject this H 0 hypothesis at the 0.1% level (p = 0:0004 if we exclude the repeat subjects, p = 0:0006 if we exclude the groups with repeat subjects). Thus already with a moderate number of independent observations we …nd very strong support for our main hypothesis.
Treatment BA provides further insights into the use of information. This treatment only di¤ers from EX by the additional estimate subjects are asked to give before they get feedback on the results of the …rst stage. Table 3 shows the data in the same form as Tables 1 and 2 , but in addition shows in the third and fourth column the estimates given in the …rst stage by the subjects who chose the lottery and those who did not and it shows in parentheses the estimates given by individual subjects both in the …rst and in the second stage (in the same order). The …rst result we observe is that estimates given in the …rst stage by subjects who chose the lottery are de…nitely higher than estimates given by subjects who did not. In particular, of 23 subjects who chose the lottery 21 expected that two or three of the remaining three subjects chose the lottery as well, whereas of nine subjects who did not choose the lottery, six expected that none or only one of the other three subjects did. In all of the six heterogenous groups the estimate given by the subjects who chose the lottery is higher than that given by the other subjects. This yields clear and signi…cant evidence in favor of a consensus e¤ect, corresponding to the traditional, inappropriate, de…nition of a false consensus e¤ect (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:001). 8 Hence we
replicate the results of classical results on the (false) consensus e¤ect. This implies that the deconstruction of the false consensus e¤ect in treatment EX is indeed due to the availability of prominent information (and the appropriate de…nition of the e¤ect) and not to other aspects of our design that deviate from most studies in psychology, as for example, the monetary incentives we provide.
The second result of treatment BA is that the estimates given after the distribution of information di¤er again in the direction opposite to a false consensus e¤ect, i.e. the average estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery are lower than those given by the other subjects in …ve of the six groups. This di¤erence fails to be signi…cant (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0:173):
But if we consider treatments EX and BA together (which appears appropriate, because in both treatments subjects had the same information presented in similar prominent ways after the …rst stage), the second stage estimates indeed are signi…cantly di¤erent (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0:025; where we again excluded in EX the repeat subjects from the averages). This supports previous experimental research that with readily available representative information, subjects do not exhibit a false consensus e¤ect, but just the opposite, they give more weight to this information than to their own choice. 9 The new aspect we learn from treatment BA is that this result 8 Note that we can apply the test to the individual …rst-stage decisions because they are independent. But even if we use the group di¤erences as in the other tests, the result is still signi…cant, Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0:027:
9 Considering EX and BA jointly as treatments with explicit information we can, of course, again reject the H 0 hypothesis that the di¤erences between estimates given by subjects who chose the lottery and by those who did not are not di¤erent in treatments with explicit and in treatments with implicit information (Mann-Whitney,
is not changed if subjects are already asked for an estimate before they receive the information, although they clearly show a consensus e¤ect at that stage. Hence subjects are not reluctant to update their beliefs substantially as a result of new information. 10 Indeed it is quite striking to study the updating of individual subjects' beliefs. Quite impressively, updating is always in the correct direction. All eight subjects whose …rst stage estimate was too high update down, all 13 whose …rst stage estimate was too low update up and of the 11 who were correct, …ve do not update, while three updated up and three down. Of course, part of this result is driven by a regression to the mean, because naturally it were above-average estimates that were too high and below-average estimates that were too low. However, more than half of the subjects, 17 out of 32, gave a …rst stage estimate of 2 and hence if we restrict the analysis to this subset, results are not driven by a regression to the mean. Of these 17 subjects, for three this estimate turned out to be too high and they all updated down, for six it was too low and they all updated up, and of the eight who were correct, three updated up and one down. 11 Thus overall, subjects clearly adapt their beliefs in line with new information, even if they had to express their beliefs before.
Glancing over the results for treatment IM, one might wonder whether subjects take the information into account at all. An ANOVA test for the hypothesis that the average estimate in the group is independent of the total information (conducted separately for the subjects who chose the lottery and those who did not) reveals a level of signi…cance p > 0:27 for the subjects who chose the lottery and p > 0:67 for the subjects who did not choose the lottery. Hence the information has no clearly discernible impact on the estimates. In contrast, in EX the estimates depend on the information at p < 0:001 both for subjects who chose the lottery and for those who did not and in BA the levels of signi…cance are p < 0:002 for the subjects who chose the lottery and p < 0:01 for those who did not. Hence if information is explicitly given it clearly in ‡uences the estimates. We summarize this in Result 4: Explicit information has signi…cant impact on estimates, while implicit information has not.
Our main results are also supported by linear regressions where we regress the estimate given by a subject in the second stage on the total number of lotteries chosen in his or her group and his or her own choice. In IM the e¤ect of the total number of lotteries in the group is positive but far from signi…cantly so (p > 0:5), while the e¤ect of the subject's own choice is highly signi…cant and positive (p < 0:001), in line with the false consensus hypothesis. In contrast, in EX and BA the e¤ect of the total number of lottery choices is highly signi…cantly positive (p < 0:001), but the e¤ect of the subject's own choice is signi…cantly negative (p < 0:05 in EX and p < 0:1 in BA). This implies that given the same total information, subjects who chose the lottery give a lower estimate, opposite to the false consensus hypothesis. Note that this negative weight does not imply that the subjects exhibit a false uniqueness e¤ect, i.e. assume that other subjects are di¤erent from them. This would be the case if their own choice had a negative weight when conditioning on the information about the other subjects. Doing this, however, the e¤ect of a subject's own choice is signi…cantly positive (p < 0:1 in EX and p < 0:01 in BA), hence in both treatments subjects also base their decision on their own choice. 12 In post-experimental questionnaires, there is interestingly not a dramatic di¤erence in the number of subjects who explicitly mention that they used the number of lottery choices in their group as an input for their estimate (17 out of 48 in EX, 11 out of 48 in IM, and 7 out of 32 in BA). Apparently the number of subjects who are completely aware of the fact that this is a rational way to proceed does not di¤er substantially between the treatments. The number of those, however, who use the information but do not consider this crucial enough to mention it, and possibly the number of those who are not even aware that the information in ‡uences their beliefs, appears to be much higher with explicit information. One might infer that the beliefs of a substantial share of subjects are in ‡uenced by explicit information without a conscious updating process, but that their beliefs obviously cannot be in ‡uenced by implicit information in the same way because this requires a conscious information retrieval. Since the questionnaires consisted
only of an open question how subjects made their choices, we can only speculate how those who did not mention that they used the information conceived their estimates.
While we cannot preclude with certainty that subjects in treatment IM tried to infer the choices of the other subjects in their group but just made mistakes, we have at least indirect support that they rather failed to realize that they can infer this information and that it might be useful. Since it is more di¢cult to derive the information in treatment IM than to just read it in treatment EX, subjects who try to infer the information in treatment IM should take more time in the second stage of the experiment than in treatment EX. We …nd the opposite. The average decision time in the second stage is 59 seconds in treatment IM, but 77 seconds in treatment EX and 101 seconds in treatment BA. According to a Mann-Whitney test using group averages as independent observations, the di¤erence in decision times is signi…cant between IM and EX (p < 0:03) and IM and BA (p < 0:001) but only marginally signi…cant between EX and BA (0:06 < p < 0:07). While the longer decision time in EX (and in particular in BA) can be attributed to the more extensive feedback, the di¤erences in decision times gives us no reason to believe that subjects in IM tried hard to infer the other subjects' choices from their payo¤, but failed. Furthermore, among the eleven subjects in IM who mentioned that they used the number of lottery choices in their own group as an input for their estimate, ten derived this number correctly. They either stated this number explicitly or the procedure they described and their estimate are only consistent with a correct inference. Therefore, while errors in the process may have occurred, we have no reason to believe that they were frequent enough to drive the results.
A possible objection against our design is that it might be biased against a false consensus e¤ect. If subjects' preferred number of lotteries is not zero or four (e.g. when they like a high maximal payo¤ but at the same time want to secure a minimal payo¤ of 4 Euros) , they should choose a lottery when they believe the others are not going to do so and vice versa, implying a negative relation between the own choice and the estimate. The strong consensus e¤ect we …nd in treatment BA, however, suggests that this bias is not very important. Apparently most subjects either want lotteries or not, but they do not prefer an intermediate number. On the other hand, some subjects expressed in the questionnaires that they thought others would choose the lottery so they preferred not to do so themselves (e.g. in order to guarantee a minimal payo¤ of 4 Euros), so that our design might indeed be slightly biased against a FCE. This, however, makes the strong false consensus e¤ect we found in treatment IM even more striking.
A …nal and somewhat puzzling observation is that, although subjects in treatments EX and BA make more use of the available information than in IM and do so in a rational manner, the overall 20 hit rate is higher in IM (10/48) than in Ex(6/48) and BA(3/32). Even the average deviation of the estimate from the correct number of lottery choices is lower in IM (2.71) than in EX (3.08) and about the same as in BA (2.72). 13 This suggests that subjects in the explicit information treatments give too much weight to the information. On the other hand, use of the information tends to reduce the probability of estimates that are wide of the mark, because the variance of the deviations is lower in BA (3.95) and EX (5.54) than in IM (6.13). 14 
Concluding Remarks
We have presented an experiment investigating the dependence of a false consensus e¤ect on the prominence of representative information. Subjects made a single choice whether or not to play a lottery within their group of four subjects and in the second stage gave an estimate how many of the twelve subjects in three other groups had chosen the lottery.
Our treatment EX where we give detailed feedback after the …rst stage con…rms the result of previous studies (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000, O¤erman et al., 1996) that there is no false consensus e¤ect when representative information is highly prominent and retrievable without any e¤ort. Indeed, there is even a signi…cant e¤ect in the opposite direction, indicating that subjects consider others' choices as more informative than their own. While the information is highly prominent in this treatment, it is less suggestive to use it when forming expectations than in Engelmann and Strobel (2000) . In that study there was no apparent purpose for the information other than being used as a guideline for the estimate, which was even highlighted by the repeated 21 switch between periods with and without information. In treatment EX the information about the other subjects' choices is well motivated by giving a more detailed explanation how the …rst-stage payo¤s resulted, making it less apparent that the use of this information was the crucial question.
Hence the results from treatment EX are stronger than our previous ones.
In contrast, in our treatment IM where the information about other subjects' choices can only be retrieved from the own payo¤ in the …rst-stage game, we …nd clear and signi…cant evidence in favor of a false consensus e¤ect. In all groups estimates of the number of lotteries chosen by the participants outside their own group are higher for subjects who chose the lottery themselves than for those who did not. We conclude that the false consensus e¤ect can be deconstructed by providing prominent representative information, and it can be reconstructed by reducing the prominence of this information.
Treatment BA …nds a clear consensus e¤ect in the estimates given by subjects in the …rst stage but again a clear e¤ect opposite to a false consensus e¤ect in the second stage after receiving feedback on the …rst stage. This indicates that subjects do not feel bound by their …rst estimate and are happy to update their beliefs if they receive con ‡icting evidence. Indeed updating of beliefs after receiving information is always in the expected direction. The fact that we …nd a clear consensus e¤ect without information but an equally dramatic e¤ect after receiving information that runs counter to a false consensus e¤ect, suggests that subjects consider themselves to some degree representative of the population but randomly sampled information to be more representative.
They appear to be thinking something like "others are like me, but others are more like others than I am."
Ex-post our results may appear to be not surprising. To us, however, the extent of the treatment di¤erences is quite stunning and we dare to say that any claim that such a dramatic shift due to reduced prominence of the information is exactly what should be expected would indeed be evidence of a hind-sight bias. The dramatic treatment e¤ect is particularly stunning because subjects had substantial monetary incentives (15 Euro) to provide a correct estimate and 22 obtaining the information in treatment IM was still rather easy. It appears to us, that most subjects simply do not come up with the idea at all that they can retrieve the other subjects'
choices from the game outcome 15 or that they do not realize that this information is valuable if it is not explicitly provided. The important implication is that we should not rely on subjects knowing (and using their knowledge) what we know they can know. Even if knowing the outcome and the game is enough to derive the other players' choices, this does not mean subjects come up with the idea to work backwards. 16 In contrast, they may ignore valuable information and hence rely more on clues like their own choice, giving rise to distortions of expectation like the false consensus e¤ect. Presentation of information can have dramatic impact. Highly prominent presentation can imply that it dominates other valuable information. One might, for example, argue that in the explicit information treatments information about the other subjects' choices is, because it is new, more prominent than the information about the subject's own choice and thus explain the underweighting of the latter. Implicit presentation of information, in contrast, can imply that it is widely ignored.
The false consensus e¤ect, when it shows up, may in fact not be, as the psychology literature suggests, an "egocentric bias", but rather an "ignoring non-prominent information" bias. This implies that the false consensus e¤ect is not really about consensus. It is only an implication for speci…c questions (namely those concerning consensus estimates). The underlying bias appears to be more fundamental, namely on the level of de…cient processing of information that is not highly prominent, coupled with more or less rational updating, given the limited information one is aware of. The e¤ect should hence appropriately be called the "Oh, you have to tell me that something you said contains some useful information" e¤ect, or the "Please wake me up before you say something relevant for a change" e¤ect.
One would naturally like to know how di¢cult it is to deconstruct this information processing anomaly by, e.g., learning. Our experimental setup, however, does not allow for repetition (feedback across rounds would be more valuable than the information provided in any single round, thus subjects should learn to essentially ignore the information) and hence other designs are necessary. Other means of deconstruction might be substantially higher incentives or hints in the instruction that non-prominence of information does not mean non-existence, i.e. that it pays to look for valuable information also under the silver platter. Slowing the decision process down, for example by allowing subjects to enter the estimate only a few minutes after they were provided with the feedback and asked the question, might also encourage them to search more intensely for additional useful information. Slembeck and Tyran (2002) demonstrate that the three-door anomaly can be almost completely eliminated with repetition if the environment allows for communication or competition, factors that might also reduce the ine¤ective processing of non-prominent information.
The e¤ect we …nd in treatment EX and BA should not be mistaken for what can be called a false uniqueness e¤ect, i.e. the belief that others tend to be di¤erent than one-self. Such a belief would imply that subjects give negative weight to their own choice in the estimation. This is not what we …nd, we only …nd that the weight given to the own choice is smaller than that given to the information about others' choices. There is, however, a tendency to give too much weight to the prominent information, a sibling of the ignoring non-prominent information bias. The robustness of this e¤ect is another issue to be settled.
From a general perspective, the present experiment (in conjunction with our previous results in Engelmann and Strobel, 2000) present a striking example how cognitive biases can be made to disappear and reappear with the aid of variations in the design that might appear minor at a …rst glance. Our results are in fact more striking than those of Friedman (1998) for the three-door anomaly, because our experiment was one-shot and hence the alleged anomaly was not reduced by learning, but disappeared completely just by presenting representative information in a highly visible way. The anomaly could be made to reappear by making this information more di¢cult to retrieve. Our interpretation of this reappearance is that the underlying mechanism of the anomaly is not, as has been suggested, egocentricity, but a de…ciency in information processing.
A Instructions
[This is a translated version of the experiment instructions. Paragraphs preceded with a treatment speci…cation in square brackets are only given in the corresponding treatments.]
[Paper instructions, given to the subjects in the beginning of the experiment.]
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment. Please, read these instructions thoroughly. If something remains unclear to you or if you have a question later on, please raise your hand. We will then approach you and solve the problem. Each of the participants in this experiment has received the same instructions.
In this experiment you will earn an amount of money, which depends on your own decisions, the decisions of the other participants and a random number generator. The earned amount of money will be paid to you in cash straight after the experiment.
We will treat all your decisions strictly con…dential. We will neither tell them to the other participants nor to anybody else.
Please, stop to communicate with other participants from now on. If you do not, the data of the experiment will become useless to us. We would have to exclude you from the payment then.
Please, also switch o¤ your mobile phone.
[Treatments EX and IM]
The experiment at hand consists of two parts. In the …rst part you have to make a decision which in ‡uences your own payo¤ as well as the payo¤ of other participants. In the second part we ask you for an estimation. In this part you can improve your own payo¤ only. Finally there 27 will be a questionnaire for statistical data. Detailed instructions for the …rst part you …nd below.
Further instructions you will get in due time on the screen.
[Treatment BA]
The experiment at hand consists of two parts. In the …rst part you have to make a decision which in ‡uences your own payo¤ as well as the payo¤ of other participants. Moreover we ask you for an estimate. In the second part we again ask you for an estimation. In this part you can improve your own payo¤ only. Finally there will be a questionnaire for statistical data.
Detailed instructions for the …rst part you …nd below. Further instructions you will get in due time on the screen.
Part 1:
There are 16 persons in total taking part in this experiment. They are divided into groups of four.
Thus, you are in a group with three other participants. Neither you nor anybody else will get to know their identity. Each participant gets an endowment of 10 EURO. Now, you can decide for or against a lottery. If you decide for the lottery, an amount of 2 EURO is collected from each person in your group (including you). The collected total amount (4 times 2 EURO) will be raised to 10 EURO by the experimenters. This amount will be ra-ed to the participants of your group, i.e. one randomly selected person receives the 10 EURO. Those who had bad luck with the lottery receive nothing and also no compensation for the collected amount of money.
The other group members have to make the same decision. If, for example, all decide against the lottery, then your payo¤ for Part 1 consists of your endowment of 10 EURO. If, for example, all decide for a lottery, you take part in four lotteries. These lotteries are independent from each 28 other, one person can therefore win several lotteries. Your payo¤ for Part 1 would then consist of 2 EURO plus the possible gains from the four resulting lotteries.
Furthermore we ask you to provide an estimation of how many of the other participants in your group decided for the lottery and how many decided against. If your estimate exactly matches the correct number then you will receive an extra bonus of 5 EURO.
Part 2:
You will receive the instructions for Part 2 in due time on the screen. In this part, each participant is only able to improve the own payo¤.
End:
Thank you very much for your participation. Please answer the …nal questionnaire on screen.
Please remain seated and stay quiet thereafter till we call you for payment.
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B Computer Screens
[In the following we report content of the computer screens as it was presented to the subjects. We report the screens of Treatment BA. For EX and IM subjects received a subset of the information as we will explain with the corresponding screens. "??" has to be substituted by the current
information.]
[Screen 1. For Treatments EX and IM, the estimation part was missing.]
Your endowment amounts to 10 EURO. Please decide now whether you want to take part in a lottery. If you opt for the lottery, the payo¤ of all four persons in your group will be decreased by 2 EURO. In return a prize of 10 EURO is ra-ed to the four persons of your group.
Please, give now an estimation of how the 3 OTHER participants in your group decided. If you exactly match the number you will get a bonus of 5 EURO. Your estimate of the number of lotteries was ??
The actual number of lotteries in the other groups was ??
Your estimate deviates from the actual number by ??
Thus, you receive for the second part a bonus of EURO ??
Your total payo¤ accounts to EURO ?? OK
